Page:Hume - A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby-Bigge.djvu/41

Cette page n’a pas encore été corrigée

Que cela ne peut avoir lieu pour les modes, est évident par la considération de leur nature. Les idées simples dont les modes sont formés, ou bien représentent des qualités qui ne sont pas unies par contiguïté et causalité, mais sont dispersées dans différents sujets ; ou, si elles sont toutes unies ensemble, le principe d'union n'est pas considéré comme le fondement de l'idée complexe. L'idée d'une danse est un exemple du premier genre de mode ; celle de la beauté un exemple du second. La raison pourlaquelle de telles idées complexes ne peuvent recevoir de nouvelle idée sans changer de nom qui distingue le mode est évidente.


SECTION VII.

Of abstract ideas.

A VERY material question has been started concerning abstract or general ideas, whether they be general or particular in the mincts conception of them. A ^ great philosopher has disputed the receiv’d opinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters, I shall here endeavour to confirm it by some arguments, which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and controversy.

  • Tis evident, that in forming most of our general ideas, if

not all of them, we abstract from every particular degree of quantity and quality, and that an object ceases not to be of any particular species on account of every small alteration in its extension, duration and other properties. It may therefore be thought, that here is a plain dilemma, that decides concernmg the nature of those abstract ideas, which have

> Dr. Berkeley.