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may be compar’d in that particular ; which is another very Sect. VI.

fertile source of relation. *’ '

1 7-, • Of modes

5. When any two objects possess the same quah/ym com- and sub-

mon, the degrees, in which they possess it, form a fifth species stances. of relation. Thus of two objects, which are both heavy, the one may be either of greater, or less weight than with the other. Two colours, that are of the same kind, may yet be of different shades, and in that respect admit of comparison.

6. The relation of contrariety may at first sight be regarded as an exception to the rule, that no relation of any kind can subsist without some degree of resemblance. But let us consider, that no two ideas are in themselves contrary, except those of existence and non-existence, which are plainly resembling,’ as implying both of them an idea of the object ; tho’ the latter excludes the object from all times and places, in which it is supposed not to exist.

7. All other objects, such as fire and water, heat, and cold, are only found to be contrary from experience, and from the contrariety of their causes or effects ; which relation of cause and effect is a seventh philosophical relation, as well as a natural one. The resemblance implied in this ^relation, shall be explain’d afterwards.

It might naturally be expected, that I should’-jbin difference to the other relations. But that I consider rather us a negation of relation, than as any thing real orpositi^. Difference is of two kinds as oppos’d either to identity or resemblance. The first is called a difference oi number’, the other of kind,


SECTION IV
Des modes et des substances


Je demanderais volontiers à ces philosophes qui fondent tant de leurs raisonnements sur la distinction de la substance et de l'accident, et qui imaginent que nous avons des idées claires de l'une et de l'autre, si l'idée de la substance est tirée des impressions de la sensation