in new ideas; but as the first ideas are supposed to be Secr. Il. derived from impressions, it still remains true, that all our —#+— simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately from He their correspondent impressions.
This then is the first principle I establish in the science of human nature; nor ought we to despise it because of the simplicity of its appearance. For ‘’tis remarkable, that the present question concerning the precedency of our impres- sions or ideas, is the same with what has made so much noise in other terms, when it has been disputed whether there be any zunafe ideas, or whether all ideas be derived from sensation and reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing but shew, that they are conveyed by our senses. To prove the ideas of passion and desire not to be innate, they observe that we have a preceding experience of these emotions in ourselves. Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing but that ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, from which they are derived, and which they represent. I hope this clear stating of the question will remove all disputes concerning it, and will render this principle of more use in our reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have been.
Puisqu’il apparaît que nos impressions simples précèdent leurs idées correspondantes, et que les exceptions sont très rares, la méthode semble exiger que nous examinions nos impressions avant de considérer nos idées. Les impressions peuvent être divisées en deux genres, celles de Sensation et celles de Réflexion. Le premier genre survient originairement dans l’âme, de causes inconnues. Le second est dérivé dans une large mesure de nos idées, et cela dans l’ordre suivant. Une
